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For 46 years, from 1948 and 1994, the National Party governed South Africa through the 
policy of apartheid, which enforced racial segregation by law between “white” and “non-
white” (“black”, “coloured” and “Indian”) inhabitants. Apartheid curtailed the rights of “non-
white” citizens and maintained minority rule by the white population. Sixteen years since 
the inception of democracy, the long-term negative effects of apartheid still shape South 
African society and politics. For the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) is the policy and regulatory framework of choice to redress past injus-
tices and ultimately transform the economy to be representative of the demographic make-
up of South Africa. While there is no question that the inequalities of apartheid have to be 
addressed, BEE policy remains one of the most controversial topics in South Africa’s public 
debate  
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy is meant to reverse the consequences of 350-years of 
race-based inequality and discrimination permeating all aspects of life of South African society, 
long before segregation was formalized through the policy of Apartheid in 1948. 
 
What does BEE want to achieve?  
BEE seeks to redress past injustices by ultimately transforming the economy to be representative 
of the demographic make-up of South Africa. This is to be achieved through the introduction of an 
elaborate system of legislation and regulations via associated sector charters and codes of good 
practice which all actors in the economy have to adhere to.  
 
 
 
                                               
1 Project Officer, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit, Regional Office Africa. 
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The main categories of measuring an entity’s compliance/adherence are: 
 
 Direct empowerment through ownership and control of enterprises and assets; 
 Management at senior level; 
 Human resource development and employment equity; 
 Indirect empowerment through: preferential procurement, enterprise development and  
           corporate social investment.  
 
It is expected that by transforming the economy through BEE, the outcome would be a reduction 
in inequality (which has an impact on poverty levels), an increase in job creation and, ultimately, 
economic growth. Therefore, BEE policy is perceived as the solution to all of South Africa’s social 
and economic problems; not only is it to contribute to the racial transformation of the economy 
but it is also to stimulate economic growth, create jobs and eradicate poverty.  
 
Has BEE been successful in achieving the desired outcomes? 
The simple answer is ‘no, except for a handful of beneficiaries with direct links to the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC)’. Since the introduction of BEE policies, data shows that South Africa is no 
less unequal than it was in the early 1990s. High unemployment rates still prevail (especially 
among Africans) and economic growth is too low to have a significant impact on job creation.   
 
In fact, BEE has had a number of unintended consequences that have hampered economic growth 
and have exacerbated the conditions that it was meant to improve. The exorbitant transactional 
and compliance costs have stifled innovation and business development, and have created an en-
vironment that is preoccupied with how to comply, and stay compliant, rather than focusing on 
sustainable job creation and development. Such a business environment makes South Africa a 
relatively unattractive investment destination. 
 
What would one have to do to achieve BEE goals? 
Only through a policy that focuses on education, training and skills development, coupled with 
policies that are conducive to business growth and foreign investment, can South Africa achieve 
its justifiable BEE goals.    
 
 
Black Economic Empowerment 
 
1. Introduction  
 
For 46 years, from 1948 and 1994, the National Party governed South Africa through the policy of 
apartheid, which enforced racial segregation by law between “white” and “non-white” (“black”, 
“coloured” and “Indian”) inhabitants. Apartheid curtailed the rights of “non-white” citizens and 
maintained minority rule by the white population. In 1958, black people were deprived of their 
South African citizenship and became citizens of one of ten tribally based self-governing home-
lands, or bantustans. The segregated public services in the fields of education, health care etc. 
provided to black people were by far inferior to those of the white population.  
 
Sixteen years since the inception of democracy, the long-term negative effects of apartheid still 
shape South African society and politics today. There is no question that the inequalities of apart- 
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heid generated through the systemic economic and other exclusion of race groups have to be ad-
dressed. For the ruling African National Congress (ANC), Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is the  
policy and regulatory framework of choice to redress past injustices and ultimately transform the 
economy to be representative of the demographic make-up of South Africa. However, BEE policy 
remains one of the most difficult, complicated and sensitive topics in South Africa’s public debate.  
It is one of the major ANC policies impacting a range of issues from poverty eradication to eco-
nomic growth and black empowerment. 
 
In recent years the policy has come under attack from both whites and blacks. Some whites have 
labelled BEE as ‘apartheid in reverse’ and some blacks have become critical of its intentions as they 
see a select, politically connected few benefiting while the majority of blacks (especially Africans) 
remain ‘underpowered’. Some argue that it is in fact BEE policy that is creating greater inequalities 
– especially within the African (black) community. This public debate can be summarized in ‘two 
groups’: the first group argues that BEE policy has a negative impact on economic growth, entre-
preneurship, job creation and ultimately poverty eradication because the policy fails to tackle the 
root problems, i.e. a failing education system and an inadequate skills development program. The 
second group argues that the reason for its hitherto failure is its improper implementation and 
modest targets and therefore stricter enforcement is required to speed up the transformation.  
 
This is obviously a simplification of the two lines of argumentation. Also, it does not mean that 
there is a clear dividing line between those in government and those that are not. On the contrary, 
there has been severe criticism from the ANC’s tripartite alliance partner Congress of South Afri-
can Trade Unions (COSATU)2 especially concerning the prevalence of corruption in BEE deals 
(‘crony capitalism’)3, nepotism in appointments, cost implications for business, especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs,) and foreign investment. Even the ANC secretary-general, 
Kgalema Motlanthe, cautions that BEE should not be a cost to the economy by saying:  
 
“Black economic empowerment should be linked directly to the expansion of the economic base 
and the restructuring of society. Rather than being a cost, black economic empowerment should 
become the driver of new growth.” – Kgalema Molanthe, ANC secretary-general, ANC Today, 4-10 
March 2005 4 
 
Thus, shedding light onto one of the major unintended consequences of BEE: its economic cost. 
  
What are the effects of BBE policy and how do they relate to the desired outcomes? 
 
There are many questions to be addressed and assessed. For instance, is BEE the correct policy for 
South Africa to meet its desired outcomes of poverty eradication, economic growth and empow-
erment? Are the unintended consequences worth the achievements made? Furthermore, one has to 
consider the broader repercussions of BEE policy in infringing on property rights and creating a 
bigger role for the state to intervene and to perpetuate dependence on the state to escape pov-
erty. 
  
                                               
2 South Africa’s government consists of the so-called tripartite alliance made up of the ANC, COSATU and the South 
African Communist Party. However, only the ANC appears on ballot papers. 
3 A term originated in the Philippines where most of the lucrative deals went to people close to President Marcos.  This 
is also true in South Africa where many presidential advisers and ‘cronies’ feature prominently in BEE deals. 
4 Ann Bernstein and Sandy Johnston, ed. Can black economic empowerment drive new growth? (Johannesburg: CDE, 
2007) Centre for Development and Enterprise In Depth.  
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This paper seeks to give an informative background look at BEE and its implementation as well as 
explore the main criticisms and possible alternatives or ‘tweaks’ to truly set South Africa on a sus-
tainable economic growth path which will eradicate poverty in the general population. Only sus-
tainable growth can provide the resources necessary for sustainable redistribution and transforma-
tion in the long run.  
 
2. The historical background of BEE 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is a central pillar of the African National Congress (ANC) 
strategy for economic transformation. It has been a consistent theme in ANC policy for several 
decades, as stated in the 1969 ‘Strategy and Tactics’ policy document: 
 
“In our country – more than any other part of the oppressed world – it is inconceivable for the 
liberation to have meaning without a return of wealth and land to the people as a whole. It is 
therefore a fundamental feature of our strategy that victory must embrace more than formal po-
litical democracy. To allow the existing economic forces to retain their interests intact is to feed 
the root of racial supremacy and does not present even a shadow of liberation.” 5 
 
The 1992 ANC Policy Guidelines detail policies required to transform the South African political 
and economic landscape in areas such as housing, land, health, social welfare and education. All 
these policies aim at creating an enabling environment to empower the black majority and in es-
sence create an African middle class, especially against the backdrop that the Indian community 
managed to prosper, to a certain degree, despite racial discrimination.6 The guidelines explained 
that the instruments used to ‘de-racialise’ the economy must apply to management in both the 
private and public sectors and that equity ownership was to be extended to people from all sectors 
of the population.  
 
In 1994 the drafting of the Reconstruction & Development Program (RDP) by the ANC government 
of Nelson Mandela allowed for a more comprehensive framework for addressing the issue of BEE, 
naming the key development challenges for the new South African government as: job creation, 
human resource development, development of infrastructure and changes in ownership patterns 
and the reduction of inequality in society. These key challenges outlined in the RDP document re-
main the guidelines for South Africa’s socio-economic policy today. While advocates of the RDP 
argue that the program oversaw significant advances in dealing with South Africa’s major prob-
lems e.g. access to clean water, land reform and housing, the critics argue that real improvement 
on the ground has been far more modest than the government claims. 
 
Under Mandela’s successor Thabo Mbeki the ANC government started speaking openly about the 
need to build a black bourgeoisie and took legislative steps to enforce BEE targets by calling for 
affirmative action quotas in business and the transfer of business operations into the hands of 
black South Africans. To the ANC, BEE policy is perceived as the ‘strategic solution’ to many of the 
challenges outlined in the RDP and as an important policy tool in eradicating poverty. Mbeki’s  
 
                                               
5 African National Congress (ANC), Black Economic Empowerment Document, http://www.anc.org.za.  
6 Johnson attributes this to the Indian community’s strong entrepreneurial and educational traditions which allowed 
them to build their own schools and family businesses during apartheid. He further goes on to say that those best 
endowed with the Protestant ethic have always been East European Jews and Indian  Muslims and Hindus. R.W. 
Johnson, South Africa’s Brave New World – the beloved country since the end of apartheid (England: Penguin Books, 
2010) p.385. 
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1998 “Two Nations” speech before the National Assembly7, explains the motivation for this push 
for enforcing BEE programs. He stated that while progress had been made, not enough had been 
done to improve the lives of poor black South Africans. Thus, a divided South Africa and two sepa-
rate nations, one rich and white, the other poor and black, had been created. 
 
BEE’s objective is not only to transfer economic power to the previously 
disadvantaged, but also to ensure that black people in general are incorpo-
rated into South Africa’s mainstream economy. However, especially during 
the Mbeki era (1999 to 2007), this goal was far from achieved in reality. 
Evidence shows that only a handful of the so-called black elite were en-
riched through BEE deals, and were thus also labelled by Jeremy Cronin 
Deputy General Secretary of SACP as ‘BEE-llionaires’ (Business Report 
03.10.04 ). The policy was enriching the already empowered blacks, 
especially those with connections to the ruling ANC government. 
 
Thabo Mbeki 
 
Consequently, criticism of BEE was prevalent in the media and from the political opposition, as 
well as from within government. To address this deepening frustration, the Mbeki administration 
went back to the drawing board in an attempt to ‘readjust’ the direction that BEE was taking and 
formulated an integrated and a more coherent socio-economic policy. As a result, the pressure on 
a wide array of economic sectors to adopt ‘transformation’ charters in 2000 increased.  
 
The BEE Transformation Charters8 
 
BEE Transformation Charters were established to formulate long-term targets to increase owner-
ship, participation and training for blacks in the different sectors of the economy. Industry and 
company based charters were portrayed as a form of private public partnerships in advancing 
BEE.9 Government did not expect every industry and company to develop a charter. Only those 
that were extensively conducting business with government had to develop charters. The first two 
transformation charters were the Mining Sector Charter and the Financial Sector Charter.  
                                               
 
To elaborate on one example, the Mining Sector Charter was a result of the publishing of the Min-
ing Bill, which put all mineral rights in the hands of the state, including expropriation and de facto 
expropriated also all existing mining rights.10 Obviously, many pointed out that this would stifle 
investment and do huge damage to the industry – which was ignored. The state would grant 
twenty-five year mining licenses to investors that were revocable at any time if the minister be-
lieved that any of the many BEE conditions were not met. In theory, this made all mining compa-
nies having to reapply for the right to continue to mine. In reality, the charter boiled down to the  
7 Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the Opening of the Debate in the National Assembly, on "Reconcilia-
tion and Nation Building, National Assembly Cape Town, 29 May 1998. 
8 Transformation Sector Charters (also referred to as Sector Charters) had to be developed for each industry, for exam-
ple the property sector or the marketing sector, then submitted to the Department of Trade and Industry which then 
assessed if it was aligned with the Broad-based BEE and Codes of Good Practice which will be introduced later in 
the paper. 
9 ‘Private sector’ is interpreted in a broad since to include businesses, trade unions and community-based organizati-
ons. 
10 Introduced during Thabo Mbek’s term, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Bill in essence was an 
alternative to nationalization, which nationalized the underlying mineral rights and turned mining concessions into 
leases.  
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simple fact of “no BEE partner, no license”. The introduction of the charter thus left mining com-
panies racing to find black partners. In some cases they were accused of ‘fronting’, which describes 
the co-option of relatively powerless but handsomely rewarded blacks to ‘decorate’ a company’s 
image. Basically, business were determined to avoid legislation that would directly intervene in the 
companies’ ownership structure or operational system, especially with government announcing 
overall target of placing at least 35 percent of the economy into black hands by 2014, and there-
fore complied voluntarily.11   
 
The Ministry of Mineral Resources itself became a vast patronage machine, handing out lucrative 
opportunities to BEE compliant companies. Mining executives knew that continuing to argue or 
taking the government to court would be counterproductive. Ultimately, the new BEE moguls – 
greatly benefiting from this new bill – were expected to contribute heavily to ANC funds and to 
support the President unconditionally. Since this new found wealth was politically derived, it re-
mained within a small and closed circle of ANC cronies.  
 
BEE practices in the mining sector exemplify the general state of affairs before the drafting of the 
Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act in 2003, implemented in 2004. The Act 
included provisions for the establishment of a BEE Advisory council, Codes of Good Practice (the 
Codes), and Transformation Charters for other sectors of the economy. The Act can be interpreted 
as the government’s reaction to the increasing criticism of the previous BEE policy and its glaring 
inability to have any positive impact on the vast majority of black South Africans. Broad-based 
empowerment aims at assuring that the redistribution process is associated with economic 
growth. The introduction of seven categories (the Codes) to determine a company’s compliance 
enhanced the complexity of the process and have officially shown that ‘empowerment’ can be 
determined by looking at other factors. However, unfortunately, black ownership and blacks in top 
management remain to be the two most important indicators of transformation.  
 
3. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) 
 
For the first decade of South Africa’s democracy, BEE initiatives focused primarily on increasing 
black South Africans’ participation in equity ownership and management. While these still remain 
key policy objectives, B-BBEE initiatives (via associated sector charters, codes of good practice and 
other legislation) also aim at addressing income inequality and development through employment 
equity, preferential procurement, enterprise development, skills development and other socio-
economic programs. Basically, B-BBEE is the legislation by which government conducts the overall 
BEE process, making it fundamentally more about economic growth and inclusive economic em-
powerment. The act itself is intended to encourage transformation by ‘broadening the beneficiar-
ies’ and including women, workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas – 
hence the name ‘broad-based’.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11  Johnson, 395. 
12 In effect, everyone is now included in some way or another, except white males. 
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The Codes of Good Practice (the Codes) 
 
B-BBEE is based on seven ‘pillars’ of participation which can be measured within a company.  The-
se are: 
 
 ownership (equity) in the entity by black persons; 
 equitable transformation in representation (staffing) employment equity targets; 
 management control of entities by black persons; 
 skills development and the transfer of skills to black employees; 
 preferential procurement (purchase of supplies) from black-owned entities; 
 enterprise development of black enterprises; and 
 socio-economic development investments.  
 
The methodology used to measure B-BBEE compliance is known as the Codes. The Codes were 
gazetted in February 2007, following the release of a number of drafts to the public. They are in-
tended to bring clarity and uniformity to measuring compliance. The 100 page document details 
the extensive different requirements according to the type of firm. However, it offers some flexi-
bility for global and multinational companies in how to structure their empowerment deals. Gen-
erally though, representation or direct empowerment does not only mean ownership but must go 
hand-in-hand with controlling power i.e. ability to appoint or remove directors by the majority 
shareholder.   
 
The Codes assist and guide the ‘priority’ sectors of industry: agriculture, transport services, auto-
mobiles, information and communication technology, engineering and construction. They recom-
mend that companies seek to achieve clear targets for ownership, management, skills and enter-
prise development as follows: BEE equity levels require that 25% of voting rights be black people; 
black management 40%; employment equity 50%; skills development 6%; equity procurement 
50%; enterprise development  8-10%; and residual elements (such as corporate social investment) 
3%. However, sectors may have different targets provided that they are not below the generally 
prescribed ones. For example the financial sector’s target for ownership is 25% by 2010. The tour-
ism industry’s target for ownership is 21% for 2009 and 30% for 2014. Any deviation from these 
targets would have to be based on economic rationale.13    
  
In practice this means a company/person who seeks to do business with the government or is de-
pendent on governmental licenses must demonstrate their level of B-BBEE compliance as calcu-
lated in terms of the scorecard contained in the B-BBEE Codes. But this does not mean that com-
panies who do not seek to do business with government do not need to comply; on the contrary 
they will need to comply because their customers will want to improve their own B-BBEE points 
by procuring goods and services from empowered enterprises. One of the controversial portions of 
this legislation is the reservation of certain government contracts for black South Africans and 
around 80% of all new jobs in government are mandated to go to blacks14.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Roger, Southall, “Black empowerment and present limits to a more democratic capitalism in South Africa,” State of 
the National 2005-2006 (Human Sciences Research Council):175-201. 
14 Michael Ellement, South Africa: from black economic empowerment (BEE) to broad-based black economic empow-
erment (BBBEE),  (2002) http://www.Helium.com. 
  8
 
The following is a generic scorecard showing the respective weightings of the seven ‘pillars’: ting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A scorecard is made for each of the seven elements. Skills development and training are to be 
achieved through private resources of the company. The transformation charters, discussed earlier, 
would illustrate in detail the sectors’ goals with respect to the seven elements. For example, the 
2008 targets for the financial sector in terms of employment equity were: senior management 
20%-25%; middle management 30% and junior management 40%-50%, and for skills develop-
ment 1.5% of the annual payroll to be spent on skill development of black employees. This illus-
trates how the weightings on the scorecard determine where a sector or company allocates its 
resources. The following is an example of a scorecard to measure ownership15: 
 
Category  Ownership indicator 
Weighting 
points Compliance Target 
2.1  Voting rights:    
2.1.1  Exercisable Voting Rights in the Enterprise in the hands of black people  3  25% + 1 vote  
2.1.2  Exercisable Voting Rights in the Enterprise in the hands of black women  2  10%  
2.2  Economic Interest:    
2.2.1  Economic Interest of black people in the Enterprise  4  25%  
2.2.2  Economic Interest of black women in the Enterprise  2  10%  
2.2.3  
Economic Interest of the following black natural peo-
ple in the Enterprise:  1  2.5%  
2.2.3.1  black designated groups;    
2.2.3.2  black Participants in Employee Ownership Schemes;    
2.2.3.3  black beneficiaries of Broad based Ownership 
Schemes; or  
  
2.2.3.4  black Participants in co-operatives    
2.3  Realisation points:    
2.3.1  Ownership fulfilment  1  
Refer to paragraph 10.1 
of Statement 100  
2.3.2  Net Value  7  
Refer to Annexe C para-
graph4 to Statement 
100  
2.4  Bonus points:    
2.4.1  
Involvement in the ownership of the Enterprise of 
black new entrants  2  10%  
                                               
15 The DTI issued the B-BBEE Verification Manual on 18 July 2008, for purposes of accreditation and verification of B-
BBEE-related reporting by the South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) and Black Economic Empower-
ment (BEE) Verification Agencies. On 17 February 2009 the first 11 verification agencies were accredited.   
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2.4.2  Involvement in the ownership of the Enterprise of 
black Participants:  1  10%  
2.4.2.1  in Employee Ownership Schemes;    
2.4.2.2  of Broad-Based Ownership Schemes; or    
2.4.2.3  Co-operatives.    
 
Jorge Araujo, Ana Milovanovic and Umunyana Rugege, “Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment”, Investing in 
South Africa 2009-2010 (Johannesburg: Webber Wentzel Attorney) 
 
This illustrates that in terms of the ownership scorecard a measured company can score up to 20 
points (23 if they attained bonus points). For instance, of those 20 points 2 points are awarded for 
ensuring that 10% of the Exercisable Voting Rights are in the hands of black women. If only 5% of 
the Exercisable Voting Rights are in the hands of black women, the enterprise will only be awarded 
one point since it is only halfway towards meeting the target.  
 
However, in some cases the calculation may not be so straightforward and more than one formula 
– specified in the Codes – has to be worked through in order to calculate the points scored for the 
measured company in respect of each of the indictors. Basically, the number of points for each 
indicator (element) will be added and the total will equal the points scored in respect of that com-
ponent. Then the sum of all the components determines the company’s BEE score. Companies are 
required to be audited on an annual basis by a certified BBBEE Verification Agency to get their 
verification or ‘scorecard’ in addition to a ‘BEE procurement recognition level’, which a customer of 
the measured company will use to determine its own BEE procurement. The higher the company 
scores on compliance the better chance for winning contracts.  
 
An example of a BEE status level which is recorded on the certificate: 
 
BEE status  Qualification  BEE procurement 
recognition level  
Level one contributor at least 100 points on the Generic Scorecard 135% 
Level two contributor 
at least 85, but less than 100 points on the Generic Score-
card 125% 
Level three contributor 
at least 75, but less than 85 points on the Generic Score-
card 110% 
Level four contributor 
at least 65, but less than 75 points on the Generic Score-
card 100% 
Level five contributor 
at least 55, but less than 65 points on the Generic Score-
card 
80% 
Level six contributor 
at least 45, but less than 55 points on the Generic Score-
card 60% 
Level seven contributor 
at least 40, but less than 45 points on the Generic Score-
card 50% 
Level eight contributor at least 30, but less than 40 on the Generic Scorecard 10% 
Non-compliant contributor less than 30 points on the Generic Scorecard 0% 
 
Generally, a good contributor to BEE is a firm with a score of 65% and above; a satisfactory con-
tributor is a firm with a score of 40% to 64.9% and a limited contributor to BEE is a firm with a 
score of below 40%. The above calculation examples show how complicated, time-consuming and 
expensive the evaluation of B-BBEE compliance is.16 
                                               
16 There is of course another snag to the system. Since the very pillar of Apartheid, the Race Classification Act has 
been abolished since 1990, the question arises: Who is black? Or white for that matter? For close on fifty years 
apartheid apparatchiks spend enormous resources to determine who was black and who was white – and could not 
come to clear and consistent applications. 
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The Advisory Council 
 
As stated earlier, the B-BBEE Act makes provisions for an Advisory Council17. The 
new Council was appointed by President Jacob Zuma (picture) in December 2009 
with the objective of ensuring that the B-BBEE system is ‘no longer embroiled in 
controversy’. President Zuma stressed that ‘B-BBEE must be an essential element 
of macro-economic strategy and a major contributor to building links between the 
first and second economies.’ 18 
 
The Council includes 19 members: the president (chairperson), ministers of trade and industry, 
labor, economic development, the minister of women, children and persons with disabilities, and 
representatives from different constituencies (trade unions, business organizations and academ-
ics). The Council’s function is to: 
 
 advise government on B-BBEE,  
 review progress,  
 advise on draft codes of good practice and transformation charters and 
 facilitate partnerships between organs of the state and the private sector.   
 
Some of the challenges that the Council is expected to deal with are abuses in the empowering 
process through practices like ‘fronting’ as well as weaknesses in the verification and accreditation 
process. One of the issues emanating from a roundtable at Small Business Project (SBP) was 
whether the president in appointing members may choose those in line with government policy, 
despite stipulations within the Act that the president must have regard to appropriate expertise, 
appoint representatives from different constituencies and follow a consultative process. Others 
questioned to what degree the Council will be accountable to the public or whether it is merely 
going to be another ‘government department’. 
 
On 20 May 2010, the Council convened and established four sub-committees to review and make 
recommendations on some of the challenges in the Codes and assess what is working and what is 
not19.  The four sub-committees deal with: 
 
 The ownership and structuring of B-BBEE deals; 
 Enterprise development and access to finance and procurement; 
 Human resource development; and, 
 Legislation, charters, compliance and enforcement. 
 
The sub-committees have the option to out-source expert opinion and commission research which 
is a way of ensuring that recommendations are based on sound empirical research. Furthermore, it 
is understood that these sub-committees are the first step towards the long-term goal of setting 
up an ‘empowerment tribunal’ which is one of the tenets of the 2009 ANC’s election manifesto. 
For instance, within the ownership subcommittee the Council could interrogate transactions – not  
 
                                               
17 No. 53 of 2003: Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003, Republic of South Africa. Vol 563 (Cape 
Town 9 January 2004). 
18 Small Business Project (SBP) roundtable entitled “Is BBBEE an effective route to inclusive development and econo-
mic growth in South Africa?” on 26 May 2010. A roundtable sponsored by FNF and attended by experts in the field 
as well as a member of the B-BBEE Advisory Council. 
19 SBP roundtable (SBP is a think tank partner of the FNF in South Africa www.sbp.org.za) 
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necessarily to stop them, but to influence and to ensure that its ‘characteristics’, according to the 
Act, are truly broad-based and empowering.  
 
Currently, the Council is considering criminalizing fronting as a solution to its growing prevalence. 
For example, there are cases where a domestic worker unknowingly finds herself as a director of a 
company. However, some cautioned against the passing of another law because it would duplicate 
common law which recognizes fronting as fraud. Moreover, Keith Levenstein (EconoBEE chief ex-
ecutive) pointed out that one of the problems leading to the prevalence of fronting was that gov-
ernment tenders only took into account the requirements of the preferential procurement frame-
work and most tendering companies where not asked to provide BBBEE scorecards.20 Others ques-
tioned whether the Department of Trade and Industry had the capacity to implement any new 
legislation regarding fronting in addition to its other duties. There is no question that this form of 
corruption has to be addressed – since the current fines are not a deterrent – but it also draws 
attention to some of the flaws in the implementation and for that matter of the policy itself. 
 
4. Criticism of B-BBEE 
 
The following section will address some of the main issues of contention around B-BBEE policy 
and whether it is truly the appropriate vehicle to sustainable empowerment, economic growth and 
poverty eradication as well as list a few suggested alternatives by some of the opinion-makers in 
South Africa. 
 
Corruption: 
Corruption (and nepotism) is one of the most common reasons for the failure of B-BBEE policy. It 
is rampant at the tendering processes at local, provincial and national level – which results in a 
culture of ‘tenderpreneurship’ at the expense of the poor, black majority. It has the detrimental 
impact of sidelining qualified firms; creating a negative perception of the business environment 
and failing to support an environment conducive to the real development of emerging/black busi-
nesses. Moreover, it contributes to the widening of the income divide especially within the African 
community – creating a few ‘super-rich’ and the majority living in dire poverty.   
 
James Myburgh explains the unintended consequences of a policy like B-BBEE by referring to P.T. 
Bauer’s analysis some thirty years ago where he draws some very relevant conclusions:21 When a 
society embarks on centralized transformation, one of the first consequences is the worsening of 
the inequality of power between rulers and ruled. When power corrupts rulers with their ability to 
allocate resources as they wish, cronyism soon follows their looting and self-enrichment. This is 
demonstrated in the arbitrary manner in which the ANC allocates jobs, tenders and mining li-
censes and how this patronage is consistently used to benefit a narrow class of ‘cronies’22.  
 
Corruption in economic activities and specifically B-BBEE deals has politicized South African soci-
ety. Too often, being a member of the ‘right’ party (namely the ANC) and in some cases the ‘right’ 
faction within the ‘right’ party is all that is required to close a deal or get appointed. Skills and  
 
                                               
20 Donwald Pressly, “Fronting must be criminal act-dti” The Star, 19 August 2010.  
21 James Myburgh, “BEE: Dead or Alive” Politicsweb, 05 February 2010.  
22 For example the recent Sishen/ArcelorMittal mineral rights deal which has failed to apply for a “new order” mining 
license for its share of the Sishen iron ore. Instead the license was granted to a politically connected company. This 
case highlights that cronyism and patronage remains rife in BEE deals with business relationships traced to the top 
of the Zuma government; in this case directly to the president’s son, Duduzane Zuma.  
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qualifications have become irrelevant. Transparency International’s Corruption perceptions index23 
scores South Africa in the medium corruption range. However, its ranking has deteriorated signifi-
cantly in the past decade, from 34th position in 2000 to 55th in 2009 out of 180 countries. 
 
Cost: 
The cost of B-BBEE in the form of transactional and compliance costs are two examples of the 
onerous impact of the BEE policy on business and the economy. A recent book by Jenny Cargill24-
Trick or Treat: rethinking black economic empowerment – focuses on the many fault lines in the 
Codes with respect to ownership and makes a clear case for redirection. Her thorough analysis and 
understanding of the complexities of B-BBEE and more specifically the Codes will hopefully gener-
ate new ideas on how to redirect B-BBEE. 
 
The estimated transactional cost of B-BBEE deals over the past decade have totalled between 
R550bn (€55bn) – R600bn (€60bn) a figure far more than the R140bn (€14bn) spent on invest-
ment in land redistribution and low-income houses! This appalling figure begs the question of how 
much of South Africa’s scarce resources should have, or should be spent, on share ownership for 
black people in the future, as opposed to education, health, jobs or housing. It is also an indication 
that there is little attempt to align ownership with other elements of the economic transformation 
policy and productive investment. The focus on redistribution through ownership rather than pro-
ductive investment is not effective or equitable. Especially when considering the fact that the ma-
jority of blacks do not have access to deals and those that do, often have to take on a huge debt 
to buy their shares. This perpetuates the cycle of ‘high-risk’ deals that fall through or shareholders 
that end up selling – selling is significant cost to the business which will be elaborated on below – 
some of the shares to repay the debt.  
 
Furthermore, the highly leveraged structures that were put in place to facilitate B-BBEE transac-
tions came under huge pressure during the 2008 global financial crisis, as assets did not generate 
enough cash flow /profit to support the financing and as the principals of these BEE ‘vehicles’ 
were unable to raise finance. As a result, the B-BBEE process is perceived by the market as an on-
going source of ‘value leakage’ rather than a once-off quantifiable transaction. Considering the 
cost and devaluation, Cargill calls for economical alternatives to black empowerment by directly 
‘donating’ shares. This would be less costly considering that the cost for the big four banks is 
2.5%-3% of their market capitalization (measurement of size of a business) to transfer 10% of 
their equity to black shareholders; which implies that giving them 3% free would have the same 
economic value as trying to sell them 10%.    
 
The cost of B-BBEE compliance is a significant burden on business, especially if black empower-
ment partners sell their stakes; does the company get full-credit for a deal done or must it start 
again to ensure that it is always compliant?25 If firms have to keep doing empowerment deals 
forever, the cost to the economy will be incalculable. Hilary Joffe of the Business Day argues that 
some of the alternatives to stop this ‘never-ending’ cycle - like forbidding black shareholders from 
selling their shares or insisting that shares be sold only to black people - would simply not work. 
The first alternative would make the shares worthless, since untradable, and the second alternative 
would devalue the shares because they would have to be sold at discount price since the pool of  
                                               
23 This survey is not an objective measure of corruption and is based on the perception of individuals in business ac-
ross the world.  
24 Jenny Cargill, Trick or Treat: rethinking black economic empowerment (Auckland Park: Jacana Media, 2010). Cargill 
is founder of BEE consulting company BusinessMap. 
25 Hillary Joffe, “Could SA’s BEE billions have been better spent?” Business Day, 6 July 2010.  
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black investors who can afford to buy them is very small. Therefore, in both instances the company 
or the shareholder loses. The government must reconsider how empowered deals are processed. 
But, the prospect of the government rethinking these polices is slim, especially when considering 
the recent comments by the Mineral Resources Minister, Susan Shabangu, who clearly stated that 
any company that sold its empowerment stake would have to do another deal. And this is merely a 
glimpse into the workings of the massive costs entailed in the transactions of empowerment deals.   
 
Preferential Procurement Regulations (2009) has added to the compliance cost of businesses. The 
regulation is intended to bring government procurement guidelines in accordance with B-BBEE 
Act (2003) and the associated Codes. Preferential procurement policies by state-owned and private 
sector enterprises are intended to channel their preferential procurement towards black-owned 
firms. This act has contributed to the considerable cost because of its ‘knock-on’ effect. For exam-
ple, when a company measures itself by the Codes and complies with a charter, it has to ensure 
that its suppliers contribute towards their own preferential procurement record. Then the B-BBEE 
status of those suppliers will have to be verified; those suppliers will have to ensure their suppliers 
are verified and so on; with the government’s decision in awarding contracts at the end of the 
verification line. 
 
This never-ending process has transferred the ‘burden’ or the responsibility of monitoring for B-
BBEE compliance to the private sector. It is basically a way of discriminating against those suppli-
ers that are not B-BBEE compliant, which is one way of ensuring general compliance in the econ-
omy. This specifically has had a significant impact on small businesses, especially those who are 
below the threshold for compliance because of their size. An additional cost due to the procure-
ment regulation is the price associated with penalties when companies are forced to break long-
term contracts with suppliers, who they are happy with, to find others that are BEE compliant.  
This process has cost some of South Africa’s leading companies an estimate of R1 billion in recent 
years, but companies believe if they had not done so they would have be out of business within 
five years. This seems to suggest that businesses have come to view B-BBEE related costs as part 
of the cost of doing business in South Africa.  
 
Moreover, the ‘pressure’ of compliance can kill creativity in that companies operate mechanically 
in the same fashion to tick off their score card requirements. It has become something that com-
panies have to bear, like a tax or getting a ‘license’. Empowerment transactions are not a once-off 
cost but rather have become a continuous cost as companies work on staying compliant with the 
additional regulations. This can impact the efficiency of companies and impact South Africa’s 
global competitiveness.    
 
It is unfortunate that something as complex as incorporating a large portion of society that was 
previously excluded on the basis of race has been reduced to mere arithmetic.   
 
Small and medium enterprises 
 
Small business and micro enterprises (SME) is an important driver of economic growth and a sig-
nificant contributor to job creation. This section will briefly look at small business development as 
a requirement of B-BBEE as well as the impact of B-BBEE policy on existing small businesses.  
 
The definition of an SME differs according to industry. In terms of the Financial Charter, a black 
SME is defined in two  ways:  a  black  company  is  a  company  with a  turnover  from  R500.000  
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(€52.000) per annum to R20 million (€2 million) per annum and is more than 50% owned and 
controlled by black people. Otherwise it is considered a black empowered company. In the Tourism 
Industry Charter black SMEs are defined as enterprises with a turnover of up to R10 million per 
annum and with more than 50% direct ownership and management of blacks. The Financial Char-
ter, exempts SMEs from the requirements of the charter if they have fewer than 50 staff members 
and less than R10 million (€1 million) of investments; unless they choose to be bound voluntarily. 
In the Tourism Charter a small business is one with an annual turnover of less than R5 million 
(€500.000) and with a staff of less than 50 employees. The Tourism Charter exempts a business 
with a turnover of R5 million (€500.000) and less per annum from the ownership requirement. This 
is an illustration of the different rules according to industries and the ambiguity around the role of 
small businesses whether white-owned or black-owned in BEE. However while white-owned small  
 
business in the tourism industry is exempt from ownership requirement it is obliged to adhere to 
other aspects of the scorecard unlike black-owned small business. Whilst these exemptions may 
help alleviate the burden of regulatory compliance for the smaller SMEs, it results in their dis-
crimination in terms of preferential procurement.   
 
B-BBEE does make provisions for enterprise development. However, most of the energy is spent on 
redistribution of already existing firms rather than developing new black-owned enterprises; this is 
a result of the weight given to ownership compared to enterprise development. The Department of 
Trade and Industry guideline for development of new black controlled enterprises has a weighting 
of 10% of the possible points while the tourism industry proposes 14% and the financial sector is 
putting more emphasis, rightly so, on this component by a weight of 22%. This further shows that 
BEE allocates a greater weight to the redistribution of existing enterprises as opposed to the de-
velopment of new black-owned enterprises. However, there is validity in the question of how real-
istic it is to expect companies with a turnover of more than R35 million (€3.500.000) to get in-
volved in enterprise development (even if it has a weighting of 10%) when the task of simply run-
ning their own business is already onerous enough. 
 
A qualifying small business has the option of choosing to be measured in terms of 5 of the 7 ele-
ments of B-BBEE. Micro enterprises (turnover of less than R300.000 est. €30.000) qualify for B-
BBEE compliance exemption; however they have the option to be a participating firm which would 
secure them a 100% procurement recognition level. It is obvious that the policies towards small 
business follow the general redistributive nature of B-BBEE that is the predominant preference 
towards ownership and management, while skills and enterprise development are secondary. Fur-
thermore, it appears that the ‘small business BEE project’ is geared towards medium to larger small 
businesses because they have more resources for redistribution as opposed to micro enterprises. 
This preference to accommodate, to a certain degree, larger small businesses rather than micro 
businesses has received some criticism for excluding an important contributor to future growth 
and employment. 
 
Small businesses have been hard hit by B-BBEE policies from another angle, that of procurement. 
Having to comply with a target of 50% BEE procurement with respect to suppliers is almost im-
possible because many small businesses rely on small suppliers who are in many cases individual 
traders or crafts people. This inability to comply prevents many small companies from qualifying 
for government tenders and specifications. This is unfortunate, since public procurement processes 
can be a major stimulus for small business growth. Another issue is the substantial cost associated 
with getting verified by a government accredit assessor which has raised concerns around verifica- 
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tion costs and the cost of setting up complicated management and tracking systems against vari-
ous indicators.   
 
The complexity of the regulatory laws leads to dependency on external consultants, aside from 
lawyers and auditors, to assist in deciphering and implementing the compliancy requirements.  
Hence, an additional cost burden results. According to a survey by Small Business Project (SBP), 
the highest area for use of consultants is labor regulations. Small business noted that rather than 
introducing new regulations, current regulations need to be better implemented, enforced and 
communicated. With that being said, it is important to look at how such issues will impact busi-
ness in general and sectors specifically, i.e. is it likely to harm or help business development in 
South Africa and the growth of a middle-class. There is a risk that small businesses might try to 
remain below the compliance threshold, and /or remain informal which would weaken their poten-
tial and ability to contribute to growth. 
 
Education and Skills Development: 
 
The current policy has not produced the desired result; poverty continues to be prevalent among 
the black community and white males still hold a disproportionate share of the highest positions 
in the private sector. Education and Skills development is where government should be directing 
its resources to achieve the desired outcomes of poverty eradication, economic growth and job 
creation among blacks rather than to the redistributive policy of B-BBEE. Though B-BBEE makes 
provisions for skills development, it is given little importance.  
 
To tackle unemployment, one has to look at education, skills, 
access to opportunities and a reliable health system. Some 
analysts are critical of the benchmarking used by government, 
rather than assessing the amount spent or allocated producing 
the desired results. In fact departments regularly under-spend 
their budgets. A re-thinking of the education system and a 
change in the perception that everyone has to attend  
university are unavoidable. However, those students that choose  
© Feline Freier                                   to  leave school  at  grade 10  should  be encouraged to do ap- 
                                                     prenticeships to gain technical  skills  that  will  assist them in  
                                                     finding jobs.  
 
Considering the current state of education and levels of unemployment, some commentators go as 
far as suggesting that companies should take a more proactive role in providing literacy and nu-
meracy training for all their employees, as well as  programs to certify artisans and training oppor-
tunities. Peter Bruce, editor of the Business Day argues that the issue of education is a matter of 
political will and courage. According to the ANC’s last election campaign, education is one of the 
five priority areas. But this does not say anything about where government resources will go. As 
Bruce further explains ‘you can’t have five priorities – you can only have one’. And education 
should be it.  
 
Acute skills shortages (among all races) are among the most pressing development issues in South 
Africa. Some argue that the skills shortage is getting worse because most of the skilled people – 
whites – are no longer freely employable because of the employment equity. Empowerment must 
be rooted in education and skills development. South Africa is caught in  a  vicious  circle  because  
 
 
  16 
 
there are not even enough teachers to train new teachers. Some suggest that South Africa should 
import skills as a short-term solution.26  
 
B-BBEE policy in the form of affirmative action has had a significant impact on the loss of skills, 
experience and institutional memory especially within South Africa’s public service. Appointments 
based on political patronage have actively harmed performance and reduced efficiency in some 
areas of the public sector. There should be a move away from the ‘deployment’ strategy and to-
wards better placement and training programs. Affirmative action and the ‘deployment’ strategy 
make the public servant accountable to the ruling party rather than the citizens.27 Inefficient pub-
lic services can hamper economic growth. This policy to a certain degree has created civil servants  
who feel that given their political loyalty, their competence has little or no bearing on their em-
ployment and performance.  There must be a focus on merit and performance.      
 
Efficiency of B-BBEE: 
 
Despite the requirements of B-BBEE, black presence in the higher levels of the private sector re-
mains low.  For example, in 2005 of South Africa’s 21,092 accountants 543 were African, 341 Col-
oured’s and 1,482 Indian.28 In 2008, less than 25% of top and senior management was black, 
against some 80% in government (some argue this has resulted in the inefficiency of the public 
sector). This further illustrates that even with the stringent B-BBEE policies in place, South Africa 
is not meeting its targets. Furthermore, it supports the argument that education and skills devel-
opment is where the government should focus to achieve sustainable transformation. Government 
continues to set targets as if unaware of the skills shortage and the poor education system and 
persists to pressure companies to be compliant with B-BBEE (affirmative action).  
 
In July 2010 Labor Minister Membathisi Mdladlana said that tougher penalties and more stringent 
measures lie ahead for those companies that ignore employment equity. This was said in the light 
of the latest report of the 10th Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) which shows that white 
males still hold 60.6% of top management positions in the private sector as opposed to 10.1% 
African males. (However, the government sector is more representative in terms of race and gen-
der.) The newly appointed chairperson of the Employment Equity Commission, Mpho Nkeli, is call-
ing for stiffer penalties for non-compliant companies. Currently, fines range from R500.000 
(€50.000) for the first offence to R900.000 (€90.000) for non-compliance for three consecutive 
years. 
 
With the proposed new legislation there will be an introduction of specific equity targets with 
specific timelines and a fine will be calculated as a percentage of a company’s turnover. Nkeli ar-
gues that current legislation makes it difficult to prosecute non-compliant companies and she 
hopes that the new legislation will make it as “easy as issuing and paying a traffic fine”. Nkeli is 
adamant that lack of skills is not a convincing reason for the low number of blacks in top man-
agement but attributes it to racism and discrimination in the private sector. In addition to more 
frequent department-led visits to companies for spot checks on employment equity, a campaign to 
“name and shame” companies that are non-compliant and “name and praise” those which do  
                                               
26 Only 32.7% (2007) of the South African population (all race groups) have completed grade 12.    
27 ‘Cadre deployment’ -  party loyalists are dispatched to do the ruling party's bidding in the public service, local go-
vernment administration and independent state institutions, has entrenched the ANC's power and created a closed 
circle of party cronies.   
28 Johnson, 432  
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comply will be introduced. Analysts, however, believe that punishment will not necessarily lead to 
more compliance. 
 
Yet again this is a demonstration that the government fails to see that the root causes of continu-
ous inequalities are bad education and lack of skills and that this is where government should fo-
cus, rather than introducing stringent measures which lead to the appointment of unqualified 
people in order for companies to avoid fines. In addition, the possible introduction of fines is likely 
to damage investment, consequently slow down growth and increase unemployment. A focus on 
the deficiencies of the South African education system and the introduction of reliable skills de-
velopment programs are essential to achieve the overall objectives of B-BBEE. 
 
Poverty eradication and economic growth: 
 
Poverty eradication and economic growth are two major desired outcomes of B-BBEE. However, 
Ann Bernstein and Antony Altbeker from the Centre for Development and Enterprise make the case 
that South Africa can only rid itself of stubborn poverty through rapid growth. Given the amount  
 
of resources the South African government has spent on social grants (beneficiaries are up from 2 
million in 1999 to 14 million in 2009!), on 40% of schools offering free schooling (soon to be 
60%), and government introducing subsidies for water, transport and electricity, in addition to the 
billions spent on BEE, far to little has been achieved in terms of poverty alleviation and BEE has 
even been counter productive for economic growth.29  
 
South Africa is no less unequal than in it was in the early 1990s and may actually be more un-
equal now. Bernstein and Altbeker note that reducing poverty and inequality are two different 
goals and may require different strategies. Poverty can only be alleviated through higher economic 
growth and an inclusive job-intensive strategy. In a period of sustained high economic growth 
large numbers of jobs can be created in a short period of time. Yet, this sustained high growth at 
times increases inequality in the short term and any attempts to reduce this inequality through 
public spending has a negative effect on economic growth. South Africa remains one of the most 
unequal societies in the world despite being a highly redistributive developing countries with high 
public spending on education, housing, healthcare and social grants. This ‘anomaly’ is a result of 
B-BBEE policy which is a significant contributor to widening inequality.  
 
Private sector training should be expanded but it is understood that this approach will take time to 
actually see a reduction in inequality. Also, it will not help those people whose education has been 
compromised. If South Africa continues its redistributive polices through the increased welfare 
spending, extended public works and more spending on BEE – even if properly implemented – the 
result can only be a marginal difference. If poorly implemented, the money will just benefit the 
non-poor. Increased spending on redistributive policies has negative effects on South Africa’s 
growth potential. Every rand spent on BEE is a rand less spent on fixing schools, and ports. Bern-
stein and Altbeker recommend that South Africa should draw from the success of other countries 
such as Brazil – previously known for being one of the most unequal societies – which followed a 
policy of rapid economic growth with modest welfare expenditure and has seen a drop of poverty 
from 30% in the late 1990s to about 16% today – coupled with the a fall in inequality.   
 
                                               
29 Ann Bernstein and Antony Altbeker, “Rapid Growth the Only way to rid SA of stubborn poverty,” BusinessDay, 31 
August 2010.  
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State intervention: 
 
The South African government perceives state intervention to be necessary or rather the only op-
tion to rectify the inequalities of apartheid. Because the state intervened on behalf of whites, it is 
only fair that the new government should intervene on behalf of blacks. This kind of approach has 
to a certain extent eliminated any chance that the government may be receptive to alternative 
options for the empowerment and inclusion of blacks into the economy. BEE, as Cargill puts it, 
“constitutes the single biggest exercise in social engineering seen since formalized apartheid was 
introduced in the fifties.”30  
 
A certain degree of state intervention can be expected when considering Section 9[2] of the 1996 
Constitution that provides for divergence from the principle of equality before the law in that ‘leg-
islative and other measures’ may be taken to advance persons ‘previously disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination.’ However, it is the extent of state intervention that has undermined rather than 
promoted many of its own objectives. Surveys by various institutions demonstrate the close corre-
lation between economic prosperity and economic and political freedom, and that open economies  
are more prosperous than closed ones. South Africa, despite its mineral wealth and despite the 
fact that industrial development began about 130 years ago, ranks only 94th out of 162 places in 
the Human Development Index for 1999; out-ranked by Malaysia (56th), Paraguay (80th) and Turk-
menistan (83rd).31  
 
John-Kane-Berman, chief executive of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), ar-
gues that if the South African state would stick to its duties and give priority to promoting em-
ployment without having race-based policies, black former victims of apartheid would be the main 
beneficiaries of employment-promoting policies because most of the unemployed and the poor are 
black. The state should be neutral, but when it acts to further the interests of particular races or 
classes or parties then it obviously violates the principle of neutrality. It is evident that state inter-
vention in the form of BEE is a leverage instrument to achieve its labor market redistribution aims. 
This overrules the market system in remunerating and allocating skills and factors of production to 
a mere percentage.  
 
According to SAIRR’s review of income and employment indicators there is evidence that the 
white community might have developed a greater sense of entrepreneurship and independence 
because of the various discriminatory empowerment and affirmative action policies. While the 
many African South Africans hope that government-driven affirmative action and empowerment 
policies will offer them the opportunity to escape poverty. However, a decade of evidence shows 
that other than the establishment of a small African middle class most of the Africans have been 
left behind. This has led to some to call for granting the government authority to nationalize pri-
vate business in order to hand this ‘wealth’ over to the poor. This is another unintended conse-
quence of BEE policies. 
 
The Financial Sector Charters, as explained earlier, are a perfect example of how state intervention 
manifests itself. It basically requires banks to make funding available for the acquisition of equity 
by black-owned companies, this means that black investors would get shares without having to 
pay for them and the financiers would get enhanced returns. However, some argue that the fund-
ing structure is underpriced because if they were priced for heavy debt with the absence of collat- 
                                               
30 Cargill, 27. 
31 John Kane-Berman, Empowerment: the need for a liberal strategy (Johannesburg: ,2002) 
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eral the deals would never have been done. Because of political pressure - and in reality state in-
tervention to bring black South Africans into the top ranks of the corporate sector -, banks went 
ahead. State intervention in the form of BEE ownership, the Codes and the manner in which it is 
financed is based on a principle known as a moral hazard because it relies on borrowed money.  
 
Paul Krugman notes, ‘Borrowed money is inherently likely to produce a moral hazard, in any situa-
tion in which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else 
bears the cost if things go badly wrong.’32 This is clearly demonstrated in the performance of the 
mining industry which has experienced a continuous decline since the introduction of the mining 
charters in 2002. While other comparable mining countries continue to outperform South Africa, 
despite it being the richest country in the world in terms of commodity endowment.33 State inter-
vention through B-BBEE extinguishes any inkling of entrepreneurial spirit and any understanding 
of the importance of starting small and working-hard.      
 
Alternatives and perspectives: 
 
Many opinion makers and figures in business are trying to make the most of what is possible 
within the current framework. The following are a few alternatives from different perspectives. 
 
Tandem franchising is a creative solution developed by entrepreneur and franchising consultant 
Eric Parker as a possible solution to one of South Africa’s most difficult economic challenges: how 
to boost B-BBEE at the individual level while transferring skills and creating jobs. The concept puts 
a promising B-BBEE candidate (emerging franchisee) and an experienced mentor together in a 
joint venture. This type of franchising, he believes, is the answer to how to transfer necessary skills 
to individual B-BBEE candidates and how to fund those candidates. SA Breweries has already 
adopted a tandem franchising strategy.   
 
 
In practice this would work as follows: the promising franchisee 
buys an initial minority stake in the venture, say 10%. S/he and 
the mentor (typically of the franchisor’s management team) 
operate and manage the business together until the franchisee 
is able to run it single-handedly. The franchisee continues to 
follow the successful formula to grow  the  franchised  business  
and  create  jobs.  The  basic  premise  is  that  the  franchisee’s 
© Feline Freier                                  equity share will increase over time and that the mentor will be  
                                                    rewarded based on the performance and achievement of profit 
targets. The franchisee acts as an assistant manager for the first year (as an example) and earns a 
salary. All dividends go into a fund to allow the franchisee to buy more equity. The mentor may be 
a qualified manager or even an existing franchisee and doesn’t have to be an entrepreneur but 
must have all the skills required for the specific business and receive an appropriate incentive.  The 
mentoring program must be well structured and allow for continuing monitoring with specific 
objectives and timeframes that are to be quantified and communicated. This is a solution for com-
panies to be B-BBEE compliant while truly transferring skills and achieving real broad-based par-
ticipation, additionally also dealing with the issue of the low number of business start-ups in 
South Africa. 
 
                                               
32 Cargill,37  
33 Bank of America Merrill Lynch, South Africa: the environment is getting worse not better, 12 July 2010 Report. 
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Young South Africans are not exposed to successful entrepreneurs. A program like tandem fran-
chising can help in overcoming such shortcomings by exposing potential franchisees to the work-
ings of a business environment and financial management skills, and enabling them to finance 
ventures, while they otherwise would have difficulty accessing money through conventional chan-
nels. The challenge is to achieve inclusive growth - instead B-BBEE is reduced to the Codes of 
Good Practice.  
 
Peter Bruce, Editor of Business Day, argues that South Africa needs a different economic model 
that would democratize the economy and business transactions. He refers to the German example 
of having trade unions on company boards, elections for the Chief Executive and companies that 
are 15% owned by the workforce. Would this be a better alternative to achieve the goals of B-
BBEE policy? Cargill contends that the ANC is highly dependent on the current character of rent-
seeking BEE ownership to meet its financial needs and without other sources of political funding it 
is highly unlikely that they would challenge the current formulation of BEE ownership. This basi-
cally eliminates any hope that a different strategy will be followed by the current government. 
 
Others too continue to be critical of B-BBEE and its overall approach. For example, Duma Gqu-
bule34, says even if South Africa where to meet its entire scorecard target, this would still have a 
very limited impact on development for the following reasons: 
 
 Regardless of racial categories, only 7.4% of the population are in management positions. 
 Only 12% of the labor force work in big companies – the Codes don’t apply to the other 
88% who work in small businesses. 
 Over 70% of the population is unemployed or underemployed and earning less than R2500 
per month – so the Codes wouldn’t apply to them.35 
 
This argument further supports the opinion that B-BBEE’s approach to transformation, economic 
growth and poverty alleviation is fundamentally ill-conceived and is far removed from the realities 
on the ground. Other opinion-makers, such as Bobby Godsell36 see that the terminology of B-BBEE 
as misleading and unhelpful to the future of South Africa.  
 
Godsell goes on to explain that South Africa should be talking about the transformation of its so-
ciety as the key to economic growth. The focus should be on embracing all the talents that em-
ployees have to offer rather than focusing on just a few, on real empowerment, real ownership, 
real responsibility and that leadership should be exercised by individuals with real skills, real budg-
ets and real power (who must attend their board meetings – ‘no more ghost directors’). South Af-
rica needs to keep an eye on the end goal or state that it wants – a diverse but non-racial society. 
Gqubule takes the argument further by saying that if South Africa is to build a democracy one has 
to question the categorization of South Africans in racial terms as African, Coloured, Indian and 
White. What does it say about an end goal of a non-racial society when one has a government 
continuously characterizing its policy through race categories?  
 
                                               
34 Duma Gqubule is widely published financial journalist, analyst and advisor on issues of economic development and 
transformation. 
35 Small Business Project (SBP) Roundtable, Is BBBEE (broad-based black economic empowerment) an effective route 
to inclusive development and economic growth in South Africa? on 26 May 2010 at SBP offices. 
36 Bobby Godsell is currently Chairman of Business Leadership South Africa (BLSA), an association of CEOs and Chair-
men of the 70 largest corporations and multinational investors in South Africa in addition to being appointed by 
President Zuma to the new National Planning Commission in April 2010.  
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Some even see B-BBEE as an obstacle to open debate. Dr Mam-
phela Ramphele37 suggests that B-BBEE may “unintentionally cre-
ate disincentives for critical independent voices”. She explains: 
“access to preferential procurement and other BEE benefits is often 
heavily influenced by public officials who might withhold approval 
of competitive bids for goods and services from those seen to be 
too critical of the powers that be.”38 Critics, such as Moeletsi Me-
ki39, believe that B-BBEE undermines the ANC’s longstanding pol-
icy of nonracialism and perpetuates a sense of ‘victimhood’.   
Source=[http://www.flickr.com/p
htos/15237218@N00/32870629
1/ Mamphela Ramphele 7
 
Debate on the shortcomings of transformation and B-BBEE policy, ranging from the impact on the 
economy to distorting black identity, are growing among civil society, business and individuals. 
However, the current government does not show any signs of possible rethinking of the current 
policy. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is to provide an informative background of 
B-BBEE and its implementation, as well as to explore the main criticisms related to its implemen-
tation.  Furthermore, some of the complexities around compliance were revealed and some light 
was shed on the degree of the negative unintended consequences of its implementation.  
 
A policy that puts emphasis on ownership and employment equity rather than on skills develop-
ment and enterprise development, and uses the same racial classification and discriminatory poli-
cies (demonstrated in employment equity) of the past can not be expected to achieve sustainable 
transformation. Moreover, economic growth and poverty eradication require the development of 
new black-owned businesses, a functioning education system and an economy that is free from 
onerous regulations such as B-BEE.  
 
South Africa has to look at a new discourse for economic transformation rather than to get 
bogged down in ‘counting points’ as the way to transform. There has to be a move away from the 
thinking that B-BBEE is the be-all and end-all for South Africa’s major challenges. The compliance 
mindset imposed by the Codes has removed personal and organizational responsibility which is 
needed for social transformation. New alternatives and solutions have to be developed to prevent 
the unintended consequences of B-BBEE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
37 Ramphele is a South African academic, businesswoman and medical doctor and was an anti-apartheid activist 
38 Cargill, 216. 
39 Mbeki is a political economist and the deputy chairman of the South African Institute of International Affairs, an 
independent think tank based at the University of the Witwatersrand. He is the younger brother of former President 
Thabo Mbeki. He has been a frequent critic of the older Mbeki. 
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